


Yet the willingness of South Korea to respond favorably is uncertain. 9 Natural disasters have continued in 2021, and Kim noted that the country’s food situation is “tense.” 10 South Korean aid could, therefore, be a means of relief from these economic pressures. 8 Kim announced at the Workers’ Party eighth congress in January 2021 that his country’s Five-Year Economic Plan had failed.


7 Trade with China, which comprised 95.4 percent of North Korea’s international trade in 2019, dropped by more than 80 percent due to North Korea’s closing its borders as a COVID-19 prevention measure. Natural disasters have threatened the country’s food and economic security North Korea was hit by three typhoons in three weeks in the summer of 2020, causing severe flooding and widespread damage to crops. It is possible that the North Korean regime is using rapprochement to extract economic concessions and aid due to its significant domestic challenges. 5 The recent resumption-and then halting-of communication lines, as well as the recent exchange of letters between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un that led up to the decision to resume the communication channels, has generated speculation about North Korea’s motivations. In June 2020, after South Korea refused to restart inter-Korean projects that would have economically benefited the North, North Korea said it would cut off all communication with South Korea and treat the country as an “enemy.” 4 Later that month, it blew up a shared joint liaison office near its border with South Korea. The resumption of inter-Korean calls marks a shift in relations since a sharp deterioration in mid-2020, and it came after a year of signals that North Korea was not interested in improving inter-Korean relations. For the purposes of this issue brief, the term refers to those who see the policies they advocate for as promoting a more just and equitable society and world. This brief acknowledges that the term “progressive” is contested and does not necessarily represent the same views in both the United States and South Korea, nor are all self-proclaimed progressives in agreement about who can describe themselves with that term. It also outlines policy alternatives to the current approach, as discussed in the progressive community. This issue brief explores North Korean, U.S., and South Korean perspectives on engagement and diplomacy and examines barriers in the United States that inhibit the executive branch from taking a more proactive approach to North Korea. While there are efforts to restore inter-Korean dialogue, its sustainability depends on the upcoming South Korean presidential election. Looking ahead, sustained diplomacy is unlikely because the United States and North Korea have incompatible stances on the prerequisites for engagement, and major policy shifts in both countries are unlikely. This resumption and halting of inter-Korean engagement and subsequent missile tests have raised questions about the possibility of further engagement, both between the Koreas as well as between North Korea and the United States. 2 In October, North Korea began answering military and liaison office communication lines again. 1 Days later, North Korea stopped answering routine South Korean calls in apparent protest of the joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises scheduled for August. At the end of July 2021, South Korea announced that the two Koreas restored four communication lines that North Korea had cut off in June 2020 when North Korea severed all inter-Korean governmental communication.
